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A simple game model is described which tries to capture the strategic aspects of
disarmament campaigns by Soviet Union's political leader Gorbachev. It is assumed
that NATO is only incompletely informed about the true intentions of such
camPaigns which are expressed by two different types. Due to the h ypothesis of
efficient defense the Soviet Union can signal its intentions. As typical for signaling
games there exists a vast multiplicity of eyuilibria, pooling and signaling ones.
Equilibrium selection theory is applied to single out a umque solution which is always
type signaling whenever such an equihbnum exists at all.
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I. Introduction
In the following we want to describe and analyse a seyuential game model which, in a
stylized way, tries to capture the essential aspects of the strategic situations caused
by Soviet Union's political leader Mihail Gorbachev. The model assumes that the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, for the sake of simp(icity, is
modelled as one player, has no imperialistic goals, but is only interested in effective
defense. Regarding the Soviet Union it is not clear whether its motivation is mainly
effective defense or expanding its area of influence. Correspondingly, we will
distinguish two types of Soviet Union, namely a peaceful (p) and an imperialistic (i)
type, see AVENHAUS, GLTTH, and HUBER, 1989, for a similar type distinction.
The other essential ingredients of our model are the DEH~ypothesis of effícient
defense (see JERVIS, 1973, HUBER and HOFMANN, 1984, HUBER, 1987, and
AVENHAUS et al., 1989), and the signaling character of the game. The defense
efficiency hypothesis is needed to justify that a certain disarmament of offensive
weapon systems is more costly for the imperialistic type i of Soviet Union than for the
defense oriented peaceful type p. The signaling character results since Soviet Union is
moving first so that the other player, by observing Soviet Union's first move, can
infer which type is actually present.
According to the DEH-Flypothesis of efficient defense one can efficiently satisfy
security needs by restructuring armed forces from o[fensive to defensive ones. Such a
drastic restructuring will seriously limit the possibilities to attack foreign countries
without endangering one's own security. Our interpretation of types implicitly
assumes that disarmament proposals mainly concern military forces needed for
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offensive operations and that disarmament will induce a restructuring of armed forces
from offensive to defensive ones.
Disarmament proposals for defense oriented weapon systems could be turned down
both by an imperialistic and by a defense oriented type of country. By such proposals
a wuntry might want to signal secvrity needs in the sense that it would welcome a
balanced reduction of defensive forces. Here we do not want to consider such a
situation but rely on disarmament proposals concerning weapon systems for offensive
military operations. So what a oountry can signal is whether it wants to preserve its
capability for major offensive operations or whether it is willing to sacrifice its own
possibilities to attack foreign countries by restructuring armed forces from offensive to
defensive ones.
A game theoretic analysis of such a move can give us some hints under which
conditions disarmament proposals rnncerning offensive weapons will signal a purely
defense oriented military policy. As typical for signaling games a definite answer will
require more refined game theoretic solution concepts since there the mocJel has many
equilibrium points. Whereas the so-called pooling equilibria deny that disarmament
proposals signal peaceful intentions, the so-called separating equilibria prescribe
different choices for the imperialistic and the peaceful type of the Soviet Union. From
a political point of view one may consider the multiplicity of eyuilibria as an
advantage since they allow us to justify a broad spectrum of political views. But for
game theory these games are certainly a challenge to develop concepts which provide
more definite answers. It will turn out that this requires strict restrictions for belief
formation.
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The main shortcoming of our model, except for its rather stylized form, is the fact
that NATO is modelled as a uniyue player. By this we necessarily have to exclude all
intentions to destabilize NATO by disarmament proposals which are naturally
welcomed by some NATO-member countries, e.g. the European NATO-members
and rather unattractive to others, for instance, for the United States of America
(USA). Here we have neglected such aspects since they seem to be less related to the
defense efficiency hypothesis. A more oomplete analysis of Gorbachev's disarmament
rampaigns will, of course, have to take into account that these campaigns might cause
serious conflicts between different NATO-member countries and thereby endanger
NATO's political intluence.
II. Tlie game moclel
Since the NATO-player N is only incompletely injor~med about whether the Soviet
Union G is of type Gi or Gp, the game starts with an initial fictitious chance move
reflecting N's information deficit about G's true type. The probability for the peaceful
type Gp o[ G is w with 0 ~ w ~ 1, whereas the imperialistic type Gi of G is expected
with the rnmplementary probability l~v. The probability parameter w retlects N's
prior beliefs rnncerning the true type of G where N's prior beliefs are assumed to be
common knowledge.




where D ( ~ 0) is the greatest arms reduction level which even a peaceful wuntry will
not want to exceed. The meaning of dt is that the Soviet Union is willing to accept
any disarmament agreement which will not abolish more weapons than dt. Thus G's
disarmament proposal d can be seen as offering a whole range of disarmament
agreements. If this range is large and the agreed upon disarmament relatively small,
the NATO-~layer N is responsible for staying below the initial proposal.
The NATO-player N oberves the proposal d E[O,D] but dces not know the type Gt
of G which has made the proposal. Knowing d, player N can choose any disarmament
level I in the range
O~I~d.
After player N's move 1 the game ends ( in case of dt - 0 it actually ends already
before since N has no decision to take).
Define
- (0 ifl -0
b-{l
in case of b- 1 we speak of a disarmament agreement; in case of b- 0 no arms




-cl if t - i
-~-
where c(~ 0) measures the security loss of a disarmament agreement with the
imperialistic type of G. If the payoff function for t- p is linear one can write it in the
form given above by appropriately choosing the unit of ineasuring disarmament. Thus
the main assumptions underlying the definition of UN are the linearity of UN in 1 and
the natural condition that disarmament contracts with Gp are desirable and those
with Gi are not.
The payoff function Ut for the types t E{i, p} of G are given by
Ut -b-ctlwithcp~0~c~1~D.
Here 6- 1 is the positive publicity effect of having initiated a disarmament campaign
which has reduced armament on both sides. The second term ctl is the security loss
implied by an arms reduction in the order of 1. The essential assumptions are again
the linearity in the disarmament level 1 as well as the intuitive condition that, due to
the efficiency hypothesis for defense, only the peaceful type dces not suffer from
disarmament. Condition c~l ~ D is imposed in order to allow that the peaceful type
Gp of G can signal its peaceful intentions. In case of cil ~ D one would have
1- ci d~ 0 for all d, i.e. the imperialistic type will always mimic the peaceful one.
This case will be discussed in Section V below.
For the two types t of G a strategy is simply the choice of a disarmament proposal dt
with 0 ~ dt ~ D. A strategy of N is a function
I(. ) : [O,D] -~ [0, D]
d F--~ I ( d )
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which assigns a disarmament level I(d) with 0~ I(d) ~ d to every proposal d E[QD].
III. Multiplicity of equilibria
In the following we want to illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria for the game I'
described in Section II which is a typical phenomenon in signaling games (see, for
instance, GUTH and VAN DAMME, 1989). In a signaling game there are players who
are informed about certain aspects of the rules of the games whereas other players
have only prior probabilistic beliefs concerning these aspecls. Furthermore, the
informed players have to decide before the uninformed players who, therefore, might
deduce from the actions of the informed players what the informed players know.
Since the Soviet Union player G(respectively, its political leader Gorbachev) is
assumed to decide before the NATO-player N is going to move, G might reveal his
type by his opening move d. Thus Gorby's NATO-game allows the Soviet Union to
signal by its proposal whether its intentions are peaceful or imperialistic.
. . .
A strategy vector s-(sl,...,sn) of an n~erson game with strategy sets Sj for
j- 1,..,n is an equilibrium point if for j- 1,...,n player j's strategy is a best reply to
R
s , i.e. if
for all strategies sj of player j. Uj(s) is the payoff of player j for the play implied by
the strategy vector s.
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For the example at hand one has n- 3 and
St -[Q,DJ for t E{i, p}
whereas SN is the set of all functions
1(. ) : [O,D] --, [0, D]
d[---i I(d ) with 0 ~ 1(d) ~ d.
A pure strategy vector is denoted by s-(di,dp,l(.)), i.e. by listing the opening moves
dt of the two possible types t of G as well as player N's decision function 1(.)
describing how he is going to react to all possible proposals d by player G.
. . : .
The first class of equilibria s-(di,dp,l (.)), which we consider, are the so~alled
pooláiag or no~a-type revenláng equilibria according to which one has
. .
di -dp-d,
i.e. both types t E{i, p} of player G propose the same disarmament level d so that d
s
dces not reveal the type of G. To support such a behavior the decision function 1(.)
can be defined as
l'(~) - d if d- d
0 if d ~ d.
. .
The strategy vector s -(d,d,l (.)) is an equilibrium point if for d~ 0 the following
conditions are satisfied:
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1- cid ~ 0 or d ~ c~ 1
and
w-{1-w)c ~ 0 or c ~~.
The first condition makes sure that type Gi of G does not want to make a proposal di
whose acceptance is unprofitable for him. The second condition guarantees that it is
optimal for player N to accept the proposal d.
:,
Of course, the choice behavior 1(d) for d~ d is intuitively rather unreasonable since
disarmament proposals d with d~ cil are to be expected only by Gp and should
therefore be accepted. But this is not ruled out since in equilibrium player N never
encounters disarmament proposals d with d~ d. All proposals d;` d are O~robability
events so that player N is free to form arbitrary beliefs since Bayes-rule (BAYES,
1763) cannot be used to assign conditional probabilities for facing Gi and Gp,
respectively. This arbitraryness of beliefs is somewhat reflected by the way in which N
reacts to proposals d~ d. If we, for instance, assume I(d) - 0 for all d~ d, this
indicates that N, after observing d, expects Gi with very high probability. If N
believes that d(~ d) will not be used by both types of G, his strategic expectations
have no implirations at all for his posterior beliefs since they exclude the choice of d.
In other words: N is not all restricted in his posterior beliefs by his strategic
expectat ions.
Proposition 1: For c ~~ all disarmament proposals di - dp - d with
0 ~ d ~ c~l and decision functions l~( ~) with
-Il-
1'(à) - d if d- d
0 ifd ~ d
deGne pooling equilibria of Gorby's NATO-game I'. o
Note that Proposition 1 describes not all pooling equilibria since also d - 0 can be an
outcome of a pooling equilibrium. According to Proposition 1 there exists a vast
multiplicity of pooling equilibria which all imply a non-revealing opening move by
player G. Of course, s-(0,0,1(-) s 0) is also an equilibrium point but one in
dominated strategies since for Gp it is never worse and sometimes better to use dp ~
0 instead of dp - 0. Similarly, s-(c~l,c~l,l(-)) with
f d ifd -ci1
I(d) -
0 if d ~ c~l
is an eyuilibrium point in dominated strategies since any proposal di with di ~ c~l is
never worse and sometimes better than di ) c~l.
. . . .
Ïype revealing or separating equilibria are given by s -(di,dp,l (.)) with
d~ ~ c~l, dp ~ c~l, and
I'(d) -~ d for d- dP
0 otherw i se .
.
Obviously, no player can gain by unilaterally deviating from s. For Gi it does not
pay to mimic Gp since 1- ci dp ~ 0 due to dp ~ c~I. For the others there is simply no
better choice given the behavior of all other players as described by s~.
-12-
Proposition 2: All strategy vectors s~ -(d~,ds,l~(.)) with d~ ~ cl, d~ ~ ca,~ p ~ i p- i
and
1'(d) -~ d for d- dp
0 otherw i se
are type separating equilibria of Gorby's NATO~ame I'. o
It should be mentioned that Proposition 2 does not describe all type separating
.
equilibria. Since G's proposal is rejected anyhow, di could be chosen also in the range
di ~ c~l although such strategies are dominated. According to Propositions 1 and 2
the equilibrium mncept alone is not sufficient to rule out unreasonable beliefs of
player N and thereby eyuilibria relying on them. Nearly nothing can be said about the
solution by just requiring the equilibrium property. In the following we wíll therefore
apply equilibrium selection theory (see HARSANYI and SELTEN, 1988, as well as
GUTH and KALKOFEN, 1989) in order to derive unambiguous predictions about the
rational decision behavior in Gorby's NATO~ame I'.
In our view, political reactions to the disarmament campaigns, initiated by Soviet
Union's politipl leader Mihail Gorbachev, reflect the two kinds of equilibrium points.
Anti~ommunistic hardliners often argue that up to the most recent past all the
changes in the Soviet Union are just a matter of publicity, political illusions or
interpretations and that it has not yet been proved that the Soviet Union has given
up its imperialistic inten[ions. They are obviously justified in asking: What proves
that a still imperialistic Soviet Union is not trying to mimic a truly peace loving one
in order to strengthen the political influence of groups and parties in NATO-member
wuntries which want to reduce NATO's military forces or are even arguing that
NATO in its present form has become obsolete?
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On the other hand many reactions, even by leading politicians clearly reveal the
signaling equilibrium interpretation of Gorbachev's disarmament rampaigns.
According to this point of view, no truly imperalistic country could be interested in
such drastic balanced reductions of military forces. So these proposals undoubtedly
reveal that at least now the Soviet Union has no desire to expand its area of influence
by military means.
Our results show that both these viewpoints are supported by appropriate equilibríum
outmmes. Thus by relying on the equilibrium wncept alone nothing much can be said
whether one point of view is more justified than the other. In the following we
therefore explore whether more refined game theoretic solution ooncepts can help us
to decide whether the signaling interpretation of Gorbachev's disarmament is more
reasonable than the pooling interpretation of anti~ommunistic hardliners and which
specífic equilibrium of the chosen type is selected as the solution.
IV. Equilibr-iurn selection
The main step in restricting the multiplicity of eyuilibria in signaling games is to
avoid the arbitrary formation of beliefs in unreached information sets. Equilibriurn
selection theory (see the pioneering approach by HARSANYI and SELTEN, 1988)
avoids this by analysing the c-uniformly perturbed games I'E of Gorby's
NATO--game I'. Assume first of all that there exists a smallest positive unit g for
measuring military strength (e.g. one tank, or one missile etc.) and that all
disarmament proposals and agreements have to be ínteger multiples of g. In an
c-uniformly perturbed game I'f all proposals dt and all possible acceptance decisions
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I(d) for any given d have to be chosen with the positive minimum probability c which
has to be sufficiently small such that players still have some freedom to choose their
moves. Thus in an c~niformly perturbed game P f all information sets are reached
with positive probability so that Bayes--rule can always be applied to derive posterior
beliefs.
Assume that one can solve uniquely all c~niformly perturbed games Pf of Gorby's
NATO-game P. The solution for I' is then simply the limit of the solutions of l,f for
c~ 0 provided that the limit exists. In the following we will first analyse the
c~niformly perturbed games I'c of P and determine their solutions. Knowing the
solution of PE the limit solution for I' will then be obvious. Since pooling equilibria do
not exist for c~~, we will distinguish the cases c~~ and c ~~. The highly
special case c-~ is of no political relevance and will therefore be neglected. For
given a priori~eliefs about G as de,scribed by w NATO is not interested in
disarmament if c~ ~ whereas it would be willing to engage in disarmament if
a) The c~se c ~ ~
This is the case where, acrnrding to its initial beliefs, NATO does not want to disarm.
Consider now an c-uniformly perturbed game I'f of Gorby's NATO-game P with
positive c. Assume that d is chosen with minimum probability c by both types C;i and
Gp of player G. "Phe expected payoff of N for I(d) ~ 0, given his observation of d, is
then
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w f I(d) - ( 1-w)fcl(d) - (w~l~v)c)I(d)
Wf f ~V f
which is negative for c ~~. Thus, in case of c~~, player N will react to any
such proposal d with I(d) - 0 where this, of course, is meant to mean that I(d) - 0 is
chosen with maximal probability. If Gp (Gi) chooses d with (more than) minimum
probability, clearly N also does not engage into a disarmament agreement. This
proves
Proposition 3: If c ~~, then in every f-uniformly perturbed game I'f of
Gorby's NATO-game I' player N will respcmd by I(d) - 0 if Gp
chooses d with minimum probability f. o
If c is small, Gi will choose d with d~ c~l with minimal probability, in equilibrium. lf
Gp uses such a proposal d with more than minimal probability, it will therefore be
accepted. Thus, in eyuilibrium, Gp will choose d with d ~ cil with minimal
probability.
Assume now that I(d) - 0 is chosen with maximal probability for all d ~ c~l, i.e. all
agreements I(d) - d with 0 ~ d~ d are realized with the same minimum
probability f. Type Ga payoff expectation for d ~ ál is therefore f E(1~-I). In
~ ~ p~l~d ~
such a situation it is clearly optimal for Gi to make the largest disarmament proposal
di - max{mg : mg ~ c~t, m E B!}
which does not exceed his critical level cil beyond which he is not interested in
disarmament agreements. The reason for this is that in an f~niformly perturbed
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game type Gi will want to allow player N to make as many mistakes as possible if
d ~ c~ 1.
Proposition4: If c(~ 0) is small an equilibrium of an c-uniformly perturbed
game I'E of Gorby's NATO-game I' requires that type Gi will
choose di with maximal probability and that player N responds
to all d ~ c~l by choosing I(d) - 0 with maximal probabilíty. o
According to Propositions 3 and 4 all type separating equilibria in c-uniformly
perturbed games I'f have to be of the form
- (d if d -d
s-(di,dp,l(.)) with dp ~ cil, I(d) 1 P
0 otherwise
where this, of course, only means that the respective moves are chosen with maximal
probability. We say that an equilibrium point of I' is unijorrnly peifect if there exists
a sequence {I'k}kEN of c-uniformly perturbed games I'k of Iwith I'k ~ I' for k~~
and with the property that one can find equilibria of the games I'k which converge to
s for k ~ o~.
Proposition 5: For c ~~ only the type separating equilibria
s - (di,dp,l(.))
- rd if d -dp
with dp ~ cil and I(d) {l
0 olherwise
-n-
of P are uniformly perfect.
Proof: Assume an c-uniformly perturbed game I'f of I'. From
Proposition 4 it follows that Gi should use di -~i with maximal
probability if N behaves according to I(.), described in the
Proposition above, with maximal probability. Given c~~
and that all d;E dp are chosen with e-probability by Gp player N
should, acoording to Proposition 3, behave acrnrding to 1(.) with
maxima) probability. If d- dp is the only voluntarily by N
accepted disarmament proposal, type Gp will clearly want to
make this proposa) with maximal probability for e sufficiently
small. Thus in every c-tmiformly perturbed game I'f with e
sufficiently small it is an equilibrium point to choose the moves
described by the strategy vector s of Proposition 5 with maximal
probability. Such a behavior obviously converges to s for e~ 0. o
Comparing Proposition 5 with Proposition 2 shows that Gorby's NATO-game Ihas
considerably more type separating equilibria than uniformly perfect type separating
eyuilibria. Especially the arbitrary choice of di in the range di ~ c~l has been
eliminated by requiring uniform perfectness. Uniform perfectness causes type Gi to
make always the largest disarmament proposal which is still acceptable to him.
In order to determine a uniyue solution for the games 1' wilh c~~, we have to
select uniquely one type separating equilibrium point as the solution for every
c~niformly perturbed game I'E of I'. Let
- IS -
- (d if d -dp
s - (di,dp,1(')) with dp ~ c~l,l(d) {l
0 otherwise
and
s-(di,dp,1(')) with dp ~ c~l,l(d) d if d- dp
- 0 otherwise
be two different type separating eyuilibria of 1'E where this, of course, means that the
respective moves are chosen with maximal probability. In the restricted game for the
comparison of s and s the only active players are those who choose different strategies
in s and "s. Thus type Gi is no active player in the restricted game for the comparison
of s and "s and will therefore not matter when deciding whether s or s will be selected
if s and s would be the only solution candidates. Now it is clear that Gp as well as
player N both prefer s to 's whenever dp ~ 8p since both payoffs increase linearly in
the disarmament level l of an agreement between Gp and N. In the terminology of
equilibrium selection theory ( HARSANYI and SELTEN, 19i3f~) this can be expressed
by saying that the equílibrium point s with the larger disarmament level dp payoff
dominates the equilibrium point "s in the restricted game for the comparison of s and
s. As a consequence we can conclude
Propasition 6: For c~~ the solution of Gorby's NATO-game I' is the type
separating uniformly perfect eyuilihrium point s-(di,D,l(-))
with
- ( d for d - D
I(d)
{I 0 otherw i se.
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Proof: For ~ sufficiently small the equilibrium point of I'~ aceording to
which all players choose the moves, prescribecl by s, with
maximal probability will payoff dominate all other uniformly
perfect equilibria. Relying on s with maximal probability is
therefore the solution of I' . a
E
b) The rrse c ~~
This is the case where, acrnrding to its initial beliefs, NATO is willing to accept
disarmament proposals. Consider an e~niformly perturbed game I'f of Gorby's
NATO-game I' with c ~~. If d ~ 0 is chosen by Gp with at least the same
positive probability as by Gi, player N's payoff expectation is at least
(w~ 1-w)c)I(d)
which for I(d) ~ 0 is positive because of c ~~. Since Gi will use all di with di ~ ciI
with minimum probability c, this implies that
I(d) - d for all c~~ t d t D.
But given this behavior of player N in all c-uniformly perturbed games I'E, it follows
that Gp will choose dp - D with maximal probability.
Proposition 7: For c ~~ and every c~tniformly perturbed game I'f of 1' it is
necessary that for cil ~ d ~ D player N chooses 1(d) - d with
maximal probability and that type Gp uses dp - D with
-20-
maximal probability. o
According to Proposition 7 there is no analogue of the pooling eyuilibria described in
Proposition 1. In an c-uniformly perturbed game player N will always accept
disarmament proposals d with d~ c~l since he knows that Gi will not voluntarily
make such proposals. Thus he is sure that meeting Gi is not more likely than meeting
Gp and that 1(d) - d maximizes his payoff expectation given his observation d~ c~l.
Proposition 7 describes the essential political results for the case c ~-I~,, namely
that any uniformly perfect equilibrium of I' will reyuire 1(d) - d for all d~ c~l and
dp - D together with di ~ ál, i.e. player N can deduce from the observation d
whether he faces type Gi or type Gp of player G. What we do not know yet is how
player N will react to proposals d ~ cil and which proposals di type Gi will choose in
the range di ~ c~l
Observe first of all that Gi rannot choose di with 0 ~ di ~ c~l with minimum
probability c in an c~niformly perturbed game I'f of I' when c becomes small. This
would imply that both types use this proposal with the same probability and that
player N must accept it with maximal probabilíty. in the limit c-~ 0 such a behavior
would imply a positive contract probability for N and Gi in spite of dp - D which
clearly would not be optimal in i'f with c sufficiently small nor in the game I' itself.
Thus we know that all 0 ~ di ~ c~l must be chosen with probability greater than c by
type Gi of player G. But in order to use all 0 ~ di ~ c~l with more than minimum
probability c all these disarmament proposals di must yield the same payoff
expectation for type Gi. Let qN(.~d) denote the mixed local stratetgy of player N
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describing his behavior after having observed the disarmament proposal d. The
condition that all disarmament proposals di with 0 ~ di ~ c~l yield the same payoff
expectation for Gi can be described as follows:
o~ I Cd qN(I
~ d)(1-c'I) -
o~ I td qN(1
~ d)(1-c'I)
for all 0 ~ d, d ~ c~l. Since N has to avoid a disarmament mntract with Gi, one,
furthermore, must have
qN(O~d) ~ 1 for c--~ 0.
Now the condition yN(I ~ d) ~ c for I ~ 0 and I- 0 reyuires that
wc -(1-w) c q~(d) - 0 for 0 ~ d C c~l
where q~(. ) denotes the mixed strategy of Gi in the c-uniformly perturbed game I'E
of l', i.e. player Gi has to choose a mixed strategy which makes N indifferent between
the choices 1 ~ 0 and 1- 0. Thus we have
q~(d) -~~~~ c for all 0 ~ d ~ c~l
where the right hand~ide is greater than c due to c ~~. Our results are
summariud by
PropoRition S: For c ~~ a uniformly perfect equilibrium point s
(qi,dp,l( ~ )) of I' requires that
-22-
(i) yi(d) - yi(d) ~ 0 for al I 0 ~ d, d ~ ci I and
qi(d) - 0 for d- 0 a nd d ~ c~ I
(ii) dp - D
d for d ~ c:l
(iii) I(d) - - ~
0 for d ~ c~ 1.
Proaf: Since di - 0 and di ~ c~' exclude a positive payoff expectation of
Gi, these disarmament proposals are realized with minimal
probability in every c-tmiformly perturbed game I'E of I'. Thus
qi(-) must be the uniform discrete distribution on 0 ~ d ~ c~l
because q~(.) is uniform, too. The results (ii) and (iii) are
obvious implications of Proposition 7 and the equilibrium
property of s. o
V. Non-signaling games
Up to now it has been assumed that the largest possible disarmament proposal D is
not smaller than the critical level c~l for disarmament proposals. Since only in the
range d~ c~l the imperialistic Gorby will not want to mimic the peaceful Gorby, the
assumption D~ c~I is absolutely necessary for signaling behavior to be in eyuilibrium.
Although one excludes type signaling behavior, it might be politically important to
consider also the class of games I' where
- 23 -
O~D~c~l.
In these games signaling equilibria are excluded since it always pays for Gi to mimic
the behavior of Gp and to hide thereby its imperialistic intentions. Every pure
equilibrium point s-(di,dp,l(.)) implies therefore di - dp if the NATO-player N is
willing to accept any disarmament proposal in eyuilibrium, i.e. if c ~~. Whereas
for c ~~ no disarmament agreement is achieved in equilibrium, the case c ~~




1(d) 1 0 otherw i se.
'Io determine the uniformly perfect equilibrium behavior one has to explore again the
c-uniformly perturbed games I'E of Iwith 0 ~ D ~ c~l. In case of c~~ both
types of G will use d- D with maximal probability in order to allow player N the
most possible mistakes. Player N, in turn, will react to all disarmament proposals d
by choosing I(d) - 0 with maximal probability.
Proposition 9: In case of c~~ and 0 ~ D ~ c~l the only uniformly perfect






For the remaining case c ~~ together with 0 ~ D ~ c~l the situation is more
complicated. To make N indifferent between all moves 0 ~ I t d for d~ d it is required
[hat




"I'hus qN(. ~ d) must be such that
~ 9M(IId)(1--cil) - E qN(I~d)(l~il)O~I~d O~I~d
for all d ~ 0 and d~ ci where qN(1 ~ d) - c for all 0 ~ I ~ d since Gp chooses d with at
least the same probability as Gi.
Thus the eyuilibrium behavior qf -(y~( ),yP( ),qN(- ~.)) ín I'f for the case c ~ 1~
and 0 ~ D ~ cil ran be described as follows: Type Gi of G will choose voluntarily all
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non-intended disarmament proposals d(~ d) with 0 ~ d as to make the
NATO-player N, after observing d, indifferent between all his moves I(d) with
0 ~ 1(d) ~ d. The NATO-player N, in turn, has to choose an appropriate local
strategy yN(. ~ d) as to make the voluntary choice of d by type Gi of the Soviet Union
player G equally profitable as the choice of d. In the limit c-~ 0 both probabilities
q~(d) and qP(d) for d~ 0 and d~ ~ rnnverge to 0 since
q~(d) - ~ c c for all d ~ 0, d~ d. For the limit yN(- ~d) for d
the local strategies qN(. ~d) one must have
0~ I ~d qN(1 ~ d)(l~il) - 1-cid
for all d~ 0, d~ d,
and
~ 1 for 1 - d
qN(1 ~ d) -
0 ot herw i se.
yP(d) - c and
~Oandd~clof
The specification of qN( ~d) for d~ 0, d;E d, has, of course, to satisfy that
~; qN(1 ~ d)( l~P ) ~ 1-cpd,
O~l~d
i.e. type Gp should not be seduced to make other proposals than d. [t is easy to see
that this condition can be implied by the upper condition if the probabilities qN(I ~ d)
for I ~ d are sufficiently high.
This indicates that yN(. ~d) for d~ 0, d~ d, has to put most of the weight on
disarmament levels 1 with I ~ d. On the one hand such proposals are more profitable
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for Gi who has to be rnmpensated for the lower probability of achieving a contract
when choosing d;E c7; on the other hand agrcemcnts I ~ d are less profitable for Gp so
that Gp is not seduced to deviate from his equilibrium proposal dp - d.
Proposition 10: In case of c ~~ and 0 ~ D ~ c~1 all uniformly perfect
equilibrium points q-(di,dp,qN(. ~.)) are of the
following form:
di-dp-d withO~d~D
J 1 for I- dqN(1 ~ d) - ll
0 ot herw i se
andforalld ~0,d~d:
~ qN(I~d)(1-cil) - 1~id
O~l~d
O~I~dqN(l~d)(l~pl)~ 1-cpd. o
As illustrated above the mixed local strategies are typically of the form that most of
the weight has to be on accepting proposals 1 ~ d in order to make Gi indifferent
between di - d and di - d for d ~ 0, d~ d, and in order to preserve Gp's incentive
for choosing dp - d with maximal probability.
VI. Political irnplications
-z7-
In the game with complete information also NATO is informed about Gorby's true
type i.e., when deciding how to react to a proposal d(~ 0), NATO would know
whether this proposal is made by Gi or GP As a consequence the two strategic
situations starting with G~ s or GP s proposal are subgames i.e., informationally
closed strategic substructures of the overall game situation.
ln the game with complete information NATO will definitely react to all proposals
d~ 0 of Gp by I(d) - d whereas proposals d~ 0 by Gi will be rejected i.e., by
choosing I(d) - 0. Thus every subgame perfect equilibrium (SELTEN, 1975) will
require Gi to make the largest possible proposal D and NATO to accept this
proposal D of Gp and to refuse any proposal d~ 0 by the imperialistic Gorby-type
Gi. Since all proposals d ~ 0 of Gi are rejected, subgame perfectness alone dces not
uniquely specify the choice of Gi. But as for the case c~ j~ uniform perfectness will
require Gi to choose the largest proposal di in the range d ~ c~l.
Thus in case of complete information the political implications are straightforward. If
there is any essential disarmament agreement then it must be common knowledge
that the Soviet Union is mainly interested in effective defense and has no offensive
military intentions. Furthermore disarmament will go as far as truly peaceful political
leaders can justify.
In the game with inoomplete information NATO's problem is that a different
treatment of Gi and Gp cannot be directly enforced but only via the different
incentives of Gi and Gp. It has been shown above that NATO's initial beliefs
determine the essential case distinction c~ w and c ~ w. In case of c~ w~ ~ ~
NATO is not willing to engage in disarmament given its a priori-beliefs as expressed
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by the probability parameter w. For c ~~ disarmament is acceptable for NATO
according to its initial beliefs even though it cannot exclude to encounter the
imperialistic type of the Soviet Union.
Proposition 6 and S describe the solution of Gorby's NATO~ame I' for both cases,
c~-~ as well as c ~~. Irrespective whether the parameter c is smaller or
greater than the critical level j~ the peaceful type Gp of the Soviet Uniun G is
always able to signal its peaceful intentions by proposing the maximal possible
disarmament level d- D. For the other players the solution behavior differs for
c~~ and c ~~. Whereas for c ~~ the imperialistic type Gi of the Soviet
Union G chooses the maximal disarmament proposal di with di ~ c~l and the
NATO-player N refuses all proposals d ~ D, type Gi of G realizes all pruposals
0 ~ di ~ c~l with the same positive probability and N refuses only those proposals d
with 0 ~ d ~ cil whenever c ~~.
To derive these results one has to apply, furthermore, different solution ideas.
Whereas for c ~~ there exists a unique uniformly perfect eyuilibrium point, one
has generally many uniformly perfect type separating eyuilibria in rase of c~~ as
shown by Proposition 5. To derive unambiguous political results for the latter case we
essentially have added the requirement that, if all players, using different strategies in
two uniformly perfect eyuilibria, prefer one over the other, the more preferred
equilibrium point will be chosen. Thus our solution of the case c~~ relies on some
trust in social rationality which underlies the notion of payoff dominance.
More generally, the political results depend crucially on whether D is smaller or
greater than c~l as illustrated by the following table:
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f.i ~ C i~ (' C~
-1 many uniformly perfect only d -D-signaling




only d.-d - D and
1 p
all pooling equilibria
-1D~ci 1(d)-0 for all d d . -d -i1~0 and~ 1 for d-dis uniformly perfect qN(d~d)-{~i for d;`il
are uniformly perfect
Table 1: The influence of disarmament cost parameters c(NATO) and ci
(imperialistic type of Soviet Union) on political results.
To derive a unique solution for c ~~ and 0 ~ D ~ c~l one again has to explore the
c-uniformly perturbed games I'E of Gorby's NATO~ame I' with D ~ c~l. Obviously,
payoff dominance will not suffice to select a solution since Gi is interested in a small
disarmament level d, whereas Gp prefers a larger one. One would have to employ
further selection criteria in order to derive unambiguous political results for the games
[' with D ~ c~l. Here we do not engage into a more detailed discussion of the case D
~ c~l since the main political results for this case are already given by Table 1 and
since such a discussion would reyuire new techniques (see HARSANYI and SELTEN,
1988, and GU'fH and KALKOFEN, 1989, as well as G(TTH and VAN DAMME,
1989, for an application).
Another reason not to engage into a more thorough investigation of the case D ~ c~l
is that we presently observe disarmament proposals by player G which seem to
resemble the dp - D~ignaling policy, i.e. we apparently face the peaceful type Gp of
G who reveals his type by making - up to now - unimaginable disarmament
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proposals. To mnclude from this that the present state of the world resembles the
case D~ c~~ requires, of oourse, a comparison of these disarmament proposals and the
cost level c~l of the imperialistic type Gi of the Soviet Union player G. It is here
where a quantitative version of the defense efficiency hypothesis would be needed.
Such a yuantitative form of the defense efficiency hypothesis muW be expressed by
defining the cri[ical disarmament level d- c~l which makes Gi indifferent between
the status quo on the one hand and the political superiority after a successful
disarmament campaign on the other hand, i.e. we are asking: How much disarmament
d will offset Gi's political superiority due to a successful disarmament proposal?
The defense efGciency hypothesis states mainly that cp ~ 0 ~ ci, i.e. only the
imperialistic type suffers from disarmament. A peaceful type would not mind to
decrease those military forces which are mainly designed for offensive military
operations and to substitute them by more defense oriented wealmn systems if
nec~sary. As our analysis has shown the parameter cp has no strategic influence at
all in lhe range cp C 0. Thus all what matters is that a peaceful Gorby gains from
disarmament; the size of his gains dces not influence the solution behavior. Cornpared
to this the cost parameter c of the NATO~layer N is decisive for whether uniformly
perfect pooling equilibria can exist at all. All what is needed to know is whether the
parameter c is greater or smaller than the relative probability ~ of the peaceful
type Gp of the Soviet Union player G. The politiral question by which one can
rephrase this condition is: Given its a priori~eliefs concerning the true military
intentions of the Soviet Union, is NATO nevertheless strongly interested in essential
redudions of offensive weapon systems7 If this question is answered in the
affirmative, this indicates that the presently prevailing state of the world resembles
the case c ~-~. For c ~~~ the risk, involved in engaging into disarmament
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although G can be of the imperialistic type, is obviously considered as more
prohibitive for disarmament policy.
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